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Abstract. We construct a model of social behaviour through the dynamics 
of  interacting  agents.  The  agents  undergo  game-theoretic  interactions 
where each agent can decide to lend support to particular other agents or 
otherwise, and agents are rewarded according to total support received. We 
analyse and carry out Monte Carlo simulations of such systems to uncover 
their evolutionary dynamics, and to explore their phase structure.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been increased interest recently in applying physics to the study of 
social and economic systems. In particular, it is hoped that statistical physics, or an 
extension of it, can model at least generic properties of such systems.
One approach has been the use of agent models. Here a collection of agents, 
whether in free space or placed on lattices or on networks, interact with each other. To 
encompass complex human interactions into these models, we require to implement 
complex interactions between agents, beyond e.g. collisions as with molecules in a 
gas, or magnetic interactions as in Ising spin systems and neural networks. Human 
interactions involve making choices, so an appropriate interaction model is that of 
game  theory.  Game-theoretic  interactions  would  entail  variables  associated  with 
strategies  (choices  of  interaction  rules),  memories  (internal  states  of  agents), 
information (pertaining to internal state of engaged agent), and learning (optimization 
of strategies).
Previous studies have included prisoner's dilemma  on a lattice (see e.g. the 
pioneering  work  of  Axelrod1,  and  elsewhere2),  substantial  work3 on  the  minority 
game4 and its modifications, and new constructions like the deviant's dilemma5,6. Here 
we present a new model designed to contain features of a certain aspect of society, 
namely rise to affluence through mutual support.
II. THE MODEL
We have agents  i, i = 1,...,N, each with a measure of influence  φ(i), moving 
freely in free space. Random meetings of i with j forces i to decide either to support j 
or  otherwise;  this  i does  by  referring  to  its  strategy  matrix  σ(iΣ),  where  Σ  is  a 
situational 6-digit binary number with digits b5b4b3b2b1b0 where b5 and b4 are the 
current values of pi(i,j) and pi(j,i), b3 is 1 iff |φ(i)-φ(j)| < αφ(i) previously, and b2 is 1 
iff φ(i) > φ(j) previously, and b1 and b0 are corresponding flags for the current state, 
telling if  |φ(i)-φ(j)| <  αφ(i) and if  φ(i) >  φ(j) now. The support matrix  pi(i,j) is also 
binary, where pi(i,j) = 1  if i supports j, and 0 otherwise. 
When faced with a decision, i would support j with probability 
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. ν  is a noise parameter. Agent j then has increased influence due to this support, φ(j) 
→ φ(j) + α pi(i,j)φ(i)   where α  is a constant. Agents are then ranked according to 
their  influence  φ(i),  and carry out  reinforcement  learning quantified by their  rank 
change, σ(i,Σ) → σ(i,Σ) + Ri' – Ri.
While the essence of a game is present in the interaction in this model, it is 
actually more complicated as the payoffs, as in the minority game, depend on the 
overall action of the agents and are not static. There is also the essence of a dilemma 
as supporting others would jeopardise one's own standing.
III. COMPUTATIONAL STUDIES
We carry out Monte Carlo simulations of the model to explore the system 
dynamics. We chose N = 100 and completed 200 iterations (interactions per pair) each 
time. To prevent blow-up, we normalize  φ after each learning cycle. Learning was 
carried out  based on the move choices 1 timestep ago so that  the effect  of those 
choices can be manifest.
Fig. 1 shows a histogram of the final distribution of influences for  α  = 0.3 
and ν  = 10.0. It shows that some structure has formed, where some agents have risen 
above the rest in terms of influence. In terms of strategies, it seems that certain ones 
emerge from the learning, as portrayed in Table 1. Winning strategies, shown in Table 
2,  are  similar  to  those  used  by  the  general  masses.  The  most  prominent  strategy 
emerging is that of continual support, which is support when  Σ = 100000. Another 
observation is  that  support  in  a  certain  situation turns to non-support in  a  similar 
situation but where the executing agent is currently more influential.
Fig. 1 Distribution of influences
       Σ                                                                        no. of agents with σ(i,Σ) in given range
000000   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1  10  51  32   6   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
000001   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   2  79  19   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
000010   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  58  42   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
000011   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  66  34   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
000100   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   3  23  38  28   8   0   0   0   0   0   0
000101   0   0   0   0   0   0   3  33  50  13   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
000110   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  54  46   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
000111   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   6  66  27   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
001000   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  23  68   9   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
001001   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  76  24   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
001010   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  54  46   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
001011   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  76  24   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
001100   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  26  54  19   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
001101   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   9  73  18   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
001110   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  53  47   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
001111   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1  57  42   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
010000   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  11  72  16   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
010001   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   3  77  20   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
010010   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  58  42   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
010011   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  56  44   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
010100   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1  23  38  31   6   1   0   0   0   0   0
010101   0   0   0   2   9  25  38  14  10   2   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
010110   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1  51  47   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
010111   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  19  53  25   3   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
011000   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  36  58   6   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
011001   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1  82  17   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
011010   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  58  42   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
011011   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  64  36   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
011100   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  15  66  19   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
influence scatter
011101   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  13  73  14   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
011110   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  50  50   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
011111   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  62  38   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
100000   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1   1   3  11  12  29  18  13  10   1   1
100001   0   0   0   0   0   0   1  19  56  23   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
100010   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   3  55  41   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
100011   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  21  59  17   3   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
100100   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  19  70  11   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
100101   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   5  80  15   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
100110   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  62  38   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
100111   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  58  42   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
101000   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  18  70  12   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
101001   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  77  23   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
101010   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  52  48   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
101011   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  62  38   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
101100   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  16  76   8   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
101101   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  79  21   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
101110   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  54  46   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
101111   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  63  37   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
110000   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1  13  38  26  17   5   0   0   0   0   0
110001   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  20  45  29   6   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
110010   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  65  34   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
110011   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  15  58  25   2   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
110100   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  21  73   6   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
110101   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  15  78   7   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
110110   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  49  51   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
110111   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1  65  34   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
111000   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  42  54   4   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
111001   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  74  26   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
111010   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  52  48   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
111011   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  63  37   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
111100   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  25  68   7   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
111101   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   3  78  19   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
111110   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  66  34   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
111111   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  77  22   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
Table 1 Final strategy distribution for all agents. The 2 middle bins are within the noise level 
from 0.
       Σ                                                                        no. of agents with σ(i,Σ) in given range
000000   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   3   4   3   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
000001   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   9   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
000010   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   7   3   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
000011   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   7   3   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
000100   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   3   3   3   1   0   0   0   0   0   0
000101   0   0   0   0   0   0   1   0   6   3   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
000110   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   5   5   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
000111   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1   6   3   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
001000   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   2   7   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
001001   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   8   2   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
001010   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   4   6   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
001011   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   9   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
001100   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1   6   2   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
001101   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1   8   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
001110   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   7   3   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
001111   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1   3   6   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
010000   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1   8   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
010001   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   8   2   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
010010   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   5   5   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
010011   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   7   3   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
010100   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   2   5   1   1   1   0   0   0   0   0
010101   0   0   0   0   2   3   2   2   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
010110   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1   4   5   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
010111   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   2   7   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
011000   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   2   8   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
011001   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   8   2   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
011010   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   9   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
011011   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   7   3   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
011100   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1   9   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
011101   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  10   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
011110   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   5   5   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
011111   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   7   3   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
100000   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1   3   3   2   0   0   1
100001   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1   7   2   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
100010   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   6   4   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
100011   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   3   6   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
100100   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   2   8   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
100101   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   8   2   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
100110   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   5   5   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
100111   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   4   6   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
101000   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   4   5   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
101001   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   7   3   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
101010   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   6   4   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
101011   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   5   5   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
101100   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   9   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
101101   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   9   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
101110   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   3   7   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
101111   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   7   3   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
110000   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   2   4   3   1   0   0   0   0   0   0
110001   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   2   5   2   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
110010   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   5   5   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
110011   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   6   3   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
110100   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   2   8   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
110101   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1   8   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
110110   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   5   5   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
110111   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   7   3   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
111000   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   6   2   2   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
111001   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   7   3   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
111010   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   4   6   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
111011   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   6   4   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
111100   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   3   7   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
111101   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  10   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
111110   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   5   5   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
111111   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   7   3   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
Table 2 Final strategy distribution for agents in the top 10% ranking. The 2 middle bins are 
within the noise level from 0.
To examine how support  evolves, we plot Fig. 2 which shows the average 
magnitude  of  support,  as  well  as  that  of  its  asymmetry.  The  asymmetry  tells  us 
whether mutual support  (low asymmetry) or the opposite occurs. It  seems that on 
average, the absolute amount of support remains constant, indicating that the society 
does  not  degenerate  into  non-interacting  individuals,  but  the  asymmetry  increases 
with time, indicating that one-way support increases in prominence.
Fig. 2 Support evolution
For differing parameters, the behaviour displayed by the system does not seem 
to change substantially. We find similar results with learning based on immediate 
move, learning based on move 2 timesteps before, with α  = 0.1, α  = 0.5, and with ν  
= 5.0 and ν  = 20.0.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied an agent model embodying mutual support and observe the 
emergence  of  structures  or  heterogeneities  in  the  influence  distribution.  More 
prominent was the emergence of successful (?) strategies. So far, the phase space of 
the system seem homogeneous.
The emergence of strategies is interesting and it would be nice to understand the 
rationale for strategies, and then to relate to real social dynamics.
REFERENCES
1. R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, New York (1987)
2. T. K. Ng and W. A. T. Wan Abdullah ‘Cellular automata studies of the 
prisoner’s dilemma’ in Proc. of the International Meeting on Frontiers of 
Physics 1998, ed. S. P. Chia and D. A. Bradley, World Scientific, Singapore 
(2000), pp. 628-631.
3. see e.g. D. Challet and Y.-C. Zhang, Minority Games, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford (2005)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
1 26 51 76 101 126 151 176
timesteps
mag
assym
4. D. Challet and Y.-C. Zhang, Physica A 246, 407 (1997)
5. A. K. M. Azhar, W. A. T. Wan Abdullah, Z. A. Kidam and A. Salleh ‘The 
Deviants’ Dilemma: A Simple Game in the Run-Up to Seniority’ presented at 
the 8th Annual Workshop on Economics with Heterogeneous Interacting 
Agents (WEHIA 2003), Kiel, Germany, 29-31 May 2003; e-print 
arXiv:cond-mat/0310340 (2003).
6. W. A. T. Wan Abdullah and A. K. M. Azhar ‘Deviants’ Dilemma – The S
Simulation presented at the 9th Workshop on Economics with Heterogeneous 
Interacting Agents (WEHIA 2004), Kyoto, Japan, 27-29 May 2004; e-print 
arXiv:cond-mat/0412107 (2004)
